Abstract. We answer a question of Paterson, showing that all block systems for the group generated by the round functions of a key-alternating block cipher are the translates of a linear subspace. Following up remarks of Paterson and Shamir, we exhibit a connection to truncated differential cryptanalysis.
Introduction
Kenneth Paterson [12] has considered iterated block ciphers in which the group generated by the one-round functions acts imprimitively on the message space, with the aim of exploring the possibility that this might lead to the design of trapdoors. The blocks of imprimitivity he uses are the translates (cosets) of a linear subspace. He asked whether it is possible to construct other, non-linear blocks of imprimitivity.
In the first part of this paper we answer this question in the negative for keyalternating block ciphers, and exhibit a connection to truncated differential cryptanalysis, following up remarks of Paterson and Shamir.
We then develop a conceptual recipe to guarantee that the group generated by the one-round functions of a key-alternating block cipher acts primitively on the message space. We show that the conditions we require are satisfied in a natural way by AES.
Preliminaries
Let G be a finite group, acting transitively on a set V . We write the action of an element g ∈ G on an element α ∈ V on the right, that is, as αg. Also, αG = { αg : g ∈ G } is the orbit of α under G, and G α = { g ∈ G : αg = α } is the stabilizer of α in G.
A partition of V is a family B of nonempty subsets of V such that any element of V lies in precisely one element of B. A partition B is said to be G-invariant if for any B ∈ B and g ∈ G, one has Bg ∈ B. A G-invariant partition B is said to
A non-trivial, G-invariant partition of V is said to be a block system for the action of G on V . If such a block system exists, then we say that G is imprimitive in its action on V (equivalently, G acts imprimitively on V ), primitive otherwise. An element B of some block system B is called a block ; since G acts transitively on V , we have then B = { Bg : g ∈ G }.
We note the following elementary
Then the blocks B containing α are in one-to-one correspondence with the subgroups H, with G α < H < G. The correspondence is given by B = αH.
In particular, G is primitive if and only if G α is a maximal subgroup of G.
We will need a fact from the basic theory of finite fields. (See for instance [6] or [8] .) Write GF(p n ) for the finite field with p n elements, p a prime.
In the rest of the paper, we tend to adopt the notation of [2] . Let V = V (n b , 2), the vector space of dimension n b over the field GF(2) with two elements, be the state space. V has 2 n b elements. For any v ∈ V , consider the translation by v, that is the map
In particular, σ 0 is the identity map on V . The set
is an elementary abelian, regular subgroup of Sym(V ). In fact, the map
is an isomorphism of the additive group V onto the multiplicative group T . We consider a key-alternating block cipher (see Section 2.4.2 of [2] ) which consists of a number of iterations of a round function of the form ρσ k . (Recall that we write maps left-to-right, so ρ operates first.) Here ρ is a fixed permutation operating on the vector space V = V (n b , 2), and k ∈ V is a round key. (According to the more general definition of [2] , ρ might depend on the round.) Therefore each round consists of an application of ρ, followed by a key addition. This covers for instance AES with independent subkeys. Let G = ρσ k : k ∈ V the group of permutations of V generated by the round functions. Choosing k = 0 we see that ρ ∈ G, and thus T ≤ G. It follows that G = T, ρ .
Imprimitivity
Kenneth Paterson [12] has considered iterated block ciphers in which the group generated by the one-round functions acts imprimitively on the message space, with the aim of exploring the possibility that this might lead to the design of trapdoors. The blocks of imprimitivity he uses are the translates (cosets) of a linear subspace. He asked whether it is possible to construct other, non-linear blocks of imprimitivity:
Can "undetectable" trapdoors based on more complex systems of imprimitivity be inserted in otherwise conventional ciphers? It is easily shown that, in a DES-like cipher, any [block] system based on a linear sub-space and its cosets leads to a noticeable regularity in the XOR tables of small S-boxes. It seems that we must look beyond the "linear" systems considered here, or consider other types of round function.
In a personal communication [13], Paterson remarks further
At the FSE conference where it was presented, Adi Shamir told me that he could break the scheme using a truncated differential attack [. . . ] Truncated differential cryptanalysis has been introduced in [7] by L. R. Knudsen; see also the approach in [14] .
In this section we answer Paterson's question for the key-alternating block ciphers described above, by showing Proof. In the notation above, suppose G acts imprimitively on V .
If G has a nontrivial block system, this is also a block system for T . So if B is a block system for G, and B ∈ B is the block containing 0, because of Lemma 2.1 we have B = 0H, for some 1 < H < T . Because of the isomorphism (2.1), we have
This completes the proof of the first implication. The converse is immediate.
Truncated differential cryptanalysis
We now develop a relation to truncated differential cryptanalysis, elaborating on Shamir's comment.
Suppose G acts imprimitively on the message space V , and use the notation of the proof of Theorem 3.1. Let v ∈ V . Now vHρ is the block containing v·1·ρ = vρ, so that vHρ = vρH, for all v. This means that for all v ∈ V and u ∈ U there is u ′ ∈ U such that
In other words we have the following connection to truncated differential cryptanalysis.
Corollary 4.1. Suppose G acts imprimitively on the message space V . Then there is a subspace U = { 0 } , V such that if v, v + u ∈ V are two messages whose difference u lies in the subspace U, then the output difference also lies in U.
In other words, if v ∈ V and u ∈ U, then
Conversely, if the last condition holds, then G acts imprimitively on V .
To our understanding, a subspace U as in Corollary 4.1 could indeed be used as a trapdoor as in Paterson's scheme, and still be difficult to detect. This is most clear when U is chosen to have dimension half of that of V . To a cryptanalyst who knows U, the complexity of a brute force search is reduced from |V | to 2 |V |. However, the number of subspaces of a given dimension m of a finite vector space of (even) dimension n over GF(2) is largest for m = n/2, and is O(2 m 2 ). If U is not just given by the vanishing of some of the defining bits, it appears to us that it might be hard to find. Because of this, in the next section we approach the problem of proving in a conceptual way that such a U does not exists for a given key-iterated block cipher.
Ensuring primitivity
Ralph Wernsdorf has proved in [15] that the group G generated by the round functions of AES with independent subkeys is the alternating group Alt(n). Thus G is definitely primitive on V .
In the following we review this consequence of Wernsdorf's result from a conceptual point of view. This comes in the form of a recipe for the group generated by the round functions of a key-alternating block cipher to be primitive. We will show that this recipe is satisfied by AES in a rather natural way.
We begin with making the description of a key-alternating block cipher we gave in Section 2 more precise. (Again, we are staying close to the notation of [2] .) We assume ρ = γλ, where γ and λ are permutations. Here γ is a bricklayer transformation, consisting of a number of S-boxes. The message space V is written as a direct sum
where each V i has the same dimension m over GF (2) . For v ∈ V , we will write v = v 1 + · · · + v nt , where v i ∈ V i . Also, we consider the projections π i : V → V i , which map v → v i . We have
where the γ i are S-boxes, which we allow to be different for each V i . λ is a linear mixing layer. In AES the S-boxes are all equal, and consist of inversion in the field GF(2 8 ) with 2 8 elements (see later in this paragraph), followed by an affine transformation. The latter map thus consists of a linear transformation, followed by a translation. When interpreting AES in our scheme, we take advantage of the well-known possibility of moving the linear part of the affine transformation to the linear mixing layer, and incorporating the translation in the key addition (see for instance [10] ). Thus in our scheme for AES we have m = 8, we identify each V i with GF(2 8 ), and we take xγ i = x 2 8 −2 , so that γ i maps nonzero elements to their inverses, and zero to zero. As usual, we abuse notation and write xγ i = x −1 . Note, however, that with this convention xx −1 = 1 only for x = 0. Our result, for a key-alternating block cipher as described earlier in this section, is the following.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose the following hold:
(1) 0γ = 0 and γ 2 = 1, the identity transformation. 
.2] and
MixColumns on the first column shows that U contains four whole columns, and considering (if the state has more than four columns) once more the action of ShiftRows and MixColumns one sees that U = V .
The first part of Condition (2) is also well-known to be satisfied, with r = 1 (see [11] but also [3] ). We recall the short proof for convenience. For a = 0, the
has at most two solutions. Clearly x = 0, a are not solutions, so we can multiply by x(x + a) obtaining the equation
which has at most two solutions. If b = a −1 , equation (5.1) has four solutions. Two of them are x = 0, a. Two more come from (5.2), which becomes As to the second part of Condition (2), one could just use GAP [4] to verify that the only nonzero subspaces of GF(2 8 ) which are invariant under inversion are the subfields. According to Lemma 2.2, the largest proper one is thus GF(2 4 ), of codimension 4 > 2 = 2r. However, this follows from the more general Theorem 6.1, which we give in the Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that G is imprimitive. According to Corollary 4.1, there is a subspace U = { 0 } , V of V such that if v, v + u ∈ V are two messages whose difference u lies in the subspace U, then the output difference also lies in U, that is
Since λ is linear, we have Fact 1. For all u ∈ U and v ∈ V we have
where W is also a linear subspace of V , with dim(W ) = dim(U).
Setting v = 0 in (5.3), and because of Condition (1), we obtain Fact 2. Uγ = W and W γ = U.
Now if U = { 0 }, we will have Uπ i = { 0 } for some i. We prove some increasingly stronger facts under this hypothesis.
Let u ∈ U, with u i = 0. Take any 0 = v i ∈ V i . Then (u + v i )γ + v i γ ∈ W , and also uγ ∈ W , by Fact 2. It follows that uγ + (u + v i )γ + v i γ ∈ W . The latter vector has all nonzero components but for the one in V i , which is
This contradicts the first part of Condition (2) .
Finally we obtain
According to Fact 4, there is 0 = u i ∈ U ∩ V i . By the first part of Condition (2) the map V i → V i , which maps x → (x + u i )γ i + xγ i , has image of size > 2 m−r−1 . Since this image is contained in the linear subspace W ∩ V i , it follows that the latter has size at least 2 m−r , that is, codimension at most r in V i . The same holds for U ∩ V i = (W ∩ V i )γ. Thus the linear subspace U ∩ W ∩ V i has codimension at most 2r in V i . In particular, it is different from { 0 }, as m > 2r. From Fact 2 it follows that U ∩ W ∩ V i is invariant under γ. By the second part of Condition (2) we have
From Fact 5 we obtain immediately Fact 6. U is a direct sum of some of the V i , and W = U
The second part follows from the fact that W = Uγ, and V i γ = V i for all i. Since U = W λ by (5.3), we obtain U = Uλ, with U = { 0 } , V . This contradicts Condition (3), and completes the proof.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 can be adapted to prove a slightly more general statement, in which Conditions (1) and (2) are replaced with (1 ′ ) 0γ = 0 and γ s = 1, for some s > 1. (2 ′ ) There is 1 ≤ r < m/s such that for all i • for all 0 = v ∈ V i , the image of the map V i → V i , which maps x → (x + v)γ i + xγ i , has size greater than 2 m−r−1 , and • there is no proper subspace of V i , invariant under γ i , of codimension less than or equal to sr.
Appendix
We are grateful to Sandro Mattarei (see [9] , and also [5] , for more general results) for the following First of all, 1 ∈ U. This is because U has even order, and each element different from 0, 1 is distinct from its inverse. Now (6.1) for b = 1, and a ∈ U \{ 0, 1 } shows that for a ∈ U, also a 2 ∈ U. (This is clearly valid also for a = 0, 1.) It follows that any c ∈ U can be represented in the form c = a 2 for some a ∈ U. Now (6.1) shows that U is closed under products, so that U is a subring, and thus a subfield, of F .
